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ABSTRACT
The pervasive use of smart speakers has raised numerous pri-
vacy concerns. While work to date grants us an understanding
of user perceptions of these threats, limited research focuses on
how we can mitigate these concerns, either through redesign-
ing the smart speaker or through dedicated privacy-preserving
interventions. In this paper, we present the design and proto-
typing of two privacy-preserving interventions: ‘Obfuscator’
targeted at disabling recording at the microphones, and ‘Black-
out’ targeted at disabling power to the smart speaker. We
present our findings from a technology probe study involving
24 households that interacted with our prototypes aimed to
gain a better understanding of the design space for technologi-
cal interventions that might address these concerns. Our data
reveals complex trade-offs among utility, privacy, and usability
and stresses the importance of multi-functionality, aesthetics,
ease-of-use, and form factor. We discuss the implications of
our findings for the development of subsequent interventions
and the future design of smart speakers.
INTRODUCTION
Smart speakers, representing network-connected speakers with
integrated virtual assistants, are becoming increasingly per-
vasive in households. By the end of 2019, 200 million smart
speakers will be present in the market worldwide, with 46%
of the devices in US households [32]. Smart speakers of-
fer their users a convenient way to access information, set
alarms, play games, or set to-do lists. Smart speakers also
integrate with other devices to realize smart home applications.
However, this convenience comes at a potential privacy cost;
these devices operate in always-on mode at earshot of nearby
conversations.
Smart speakers already provision built-in privacy controls;
they are supposed to process audio inputs locally until they
detect a wake word, and they pack a button that mutes their
internal microphone. Unfortunately, both provisions are not
very effective at protecting the user’s privacy. Recent inci-
dents raise concerns about perceived privacy threats [1, 21, 22,
17]. Smart speakers can mistakenly be triggered without the
presence of a wake word [15, 20], causing it to record speech
not intended as commands. Further, security researchers have
documented actual vulnerabilities that indicate the potential
for malicious exploitation of smart speakers [26, 14, 8, 13, 36].
The effectiveness of the mute button to address these problems
is in doubt [21]. Recent studies, including the one in this work,
indicate that users find this button inconvenient to utilize and
is not trustworthy in some cases.
Figure 1: The Obfuscator design probe next to a Google Home
Mini Device. Obfuscator uses ultrasound jamming to prevent
the smart speaker from listening to the user’s conversations
and is designed to appear as a tabletop “trinket” to blend into
the user’s home environment.
As a result, there is a need to investigate more convenient and
trustworthy privacy controls for smart speakers. We believe
that the design space for such interventions is underexplored
and that design research into defining its elements and under-
standing user experience with these interventions is required.
While the privacy issues surrounding smart speakers are of
more immediate interest, our exploration can inform the design
of privacy-preserving technologies in physical spaces.
In this paper, we aim to better understand the user perceptions
around the potential technological solutions to the privacy
issues involving smart speakers. In particular, we conceptual-
ized and prototyped two technology probes [16]. The objective
of our study is not to validate our particular design choices,
but to better understand user perceptions of such interventions
and extract design requirements for them. We utilize the smart
speaker’s built-in mute button as a baseline, to understand
user perceptions of how device manufacturers provide privacy
control. Both our prototypes are bolt-on privacy-preserving
interventions: (a) Blackout, a smart plug that allows the user
to engage/disengage the power supply to a smart speaker re-
motely, and (b) Obfuscator (Figure 1), which uses ultrasound
to deafen the smart speaker’s microphone, preventing the smart
speaker from listening to nearby conversations. The probes in-
tercept two key resources required for successful smart speaker
functionality: power (for basic operation) and microphone in-
puts (for voice-based interaction).
To promote user reflection on our privacy-preserving interven-
tions, we conducted in-home demonstrations of our technology
probes through in-depth interviews at 24 households. Our in-
terviews took place over two phases in the course of a year,
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providing us with insight into how such perceptions and atti-
tudes might change over time. Our interviews involved users
with diverse demographics, including casual (or recreational)
users and power users, enabling us to distinguish perceptions
and design requirements for different user groups. Our find-
ings highlight a complex trade-off between privacy, utility, and
usability: the interventions (a) should be plug-and-playable i.e.
require minimal setup and upkeep, (b) have a small physical
footprint and fit within its environment, (c) offer additional
features beyond privacy preservation, (d) does not affect the
interaction model with the smart speaker, and (e) must survive
the test of time i.e. it should be compatible with existing and
future iterations of smart speakers. In the remainder of the
paper, we present the design of our technology probes and our
in-home study, and discuss our findings. We conclude with a
discussion of their implications for the smart speakers as well
as other privacy-sensitive technologies.
BACKGROUND
Our study considers two popular smart speakers: (a) Google
Home Mini and (b) Amazon Echo Dot. A smart speaker has
to be always on, continuously listening for a user to speak
a wake word, such as “...Alexa” or “...Google.” Ideally, the
device should only record, and communicate to its cloud, the
commands that were triggered by a wake word; the detection
of wake words happens on the device. In many circumstances,
however, the device’s operation might not match its expected
behavior giving rise to two privacy threats.
The first occurs due to compromise of the actual device or its
operation. A malicious entity can compromise the software
running on the smart speaker to turn it into a listening device.
Such an entity can also change the operation of the device
through developing applications that record the user’s conver-
sations [37, 20, 26] or inject stealthy commands to wake up
the device without the user’s awareness [28, 36, 5]. We refer
to such threats as actual privacy threats.
The second may occur due to innocuous recording i.e. when
the speaker misunderstands ongoing conversations to contain
the wake word. Figure 2 shows the portal of a popular smart
speaker referencing instances were recordings where originally
misinterpreted as queries to the smart speaker. We refer to
such threats as perceived privacy threats. It is unclear when
and how smart speakers are spuriously activated, and what is
done with the collected information. There have been several
incidents where these devices have exported user conversation,
including those not preceded with a wake word. While one
organization claims this is a one-off act [15], the other blame
erroneous code [8, 12]. Further, there have been reported
instances where several organizations hired human contractors
to listen and tag different recordings from these devices, which
include commands and non-commands [13].
METHODOLOGY
Two strategies exist to safeguard users’ privacy against both
actual and perceived privacy threats: (a) redesigning the smart
speaker to provide provable privacy guarantees, and (b) de-
signing interventions that co-exist with the smart speaker. The
former is a challenging proposition as most of the software and
Figure 2: The portal of a smart speaker showing statements
that were incorrectly interpreted as queries.
hardware required for successful smart speaker functioning
is proprietary. To this end, we focus on the latter option and
explore the design of bolt-on, hardware-based interventions
through our technology probe approach [16]. Hardware-based
interventions are less abstract than software-based ones; they
allow the participants to physically and directly interact with
the interventions. In contrast, software-based interventions
involve no such interaction with complex and potentially un-
trustworthy software. For thoroughness, we compare and
contrast our findings with usage of a built-in feature found in
smart speakers— the mute button. Through the results of our
research, we can inform better design of smart speakers, and
privacy-preserving interventions in general in physical spaces.
In designing our technology probes, we followed an iterative
design process. We first explore the broad space of solutions
(presented in Table 1), their efficacy against an adaptive ad-
versary, and discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
each approach. It is clear that modifying device hardware and
controlling network flow do not provide the desired proper-
ties. While one could change the wake word to reduce the
frequency of spurious activation/recording, this phenomenon
is not well understood for it to be a definitive fix.
Possible Solutions Actual Threats Perceived Threats
Network interception 7 7
Hardware modifications 7 7
Change the wake word 7 3
Discard smart speaker 3 3
Table 1: Broad space of possible solutions and their effective-
ness against malicious programming (or actual privacy threats)
and inadvertent recording (or perceived privacy threats).
We converged on a set of dimensions which we found relevant
to the final design of our interventions. These dimensions
include (a) the method of user interaction with the interven-
tion i.e. hands-free vs. physical, (b) the ease of deployment,
and (c) the ease of understanding the privacy properties the
intervention provides. We stress that these dimensions are not
exhaustive. We do not seek to evaluate the efficacy of each of
these interventions in preserving privacy. We do not attempt to
understand how people use these interventions as well. Doing
so requires running a long-term study with the intervention
deployed in users’ homes. We follow a technology probe [25]
approach to understand how the users of smart speakers react
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to different privacy-enhancing technologies using proof-of-
concept prototypes.
We describe the interventions used in our study, including
those we conceptualized, below.
Mute: The “mute” feature represents a built-in privacy control
(Figure 3a). It is conveniently available as a push button on the
top panel of the Amazon Echo Dot and as a sliding button on
the side of the Google Home Mini. The device manufacturers
state that the microphone is deactivated when the mute button
is turned on. Naturally, activating the mute button stops the
smart speaker from responding to the user’s voice commands.
Upon activation, the Echo Dot’s ring color changes to red, and
the four lights atop the Google Home Mini turn red. The mute
feature, however, requires the user to physically interact with
the device to engage/disengage the control, and to place trust
in the manufacturer’s implementation of the muting feature.
Blackout: While the mute button focuses on disengaging
the microphone inputs, we conceptualize another intervention
to disengage the electricity supply, causing a “blackout.” A
naive way of achieving our goal is to either disconnect the
smart speaker’s cord from the outlet or disconnect the cord
connected to the smart speaker. However, both options involve
physical interaction with the device, which might be tedious if
the devices are concealed. Thus, we use a remote-controlled
outlet1(Figure 3b). The user deploys Blackout by connecting
the smart speaker to the outlet through the smart plug (as seen
in Figure 3b). We use a commercial smart-plug because we
believe that users will be familiar with such products, mini-
mizing their time for acclimatization. Additionally, we believe
that users will trust the functionality of such widely-used prod-
ucts. Blackout is conspicuous and rugged; we believe that
its form factor makes it easier to understand and use. The
user can engage/disengage Blackout through a remote control
(with a range of operation of 100 feet) without the need to
physically interact with the device. Additionally, the smart
plug we chose provides a visual a cue — an LED glows red
when powered on to indicate that the smart speaker is active.
Clearly, Blackout offers immediate privacy guarantees. This
comes at a cost; the users have to wait for a lengthy boot time
whenever they wish to reuse the smart speaker. Additionally,
1Beastron Remote Controlled Outlet
(a) Mute (b) Blackout (c) Obfuscator
Figure 3: The three employed privacy interventions.
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Figure 4: The system design of the Obfuscator intervention.
the form factor of Blackout makes it difficult to use in some
environments (with concealed/narrow outlets).
Obfuscator: This intervention targets the microphone of the
smart speaker (Figure 3c). Obfuscator generates inaudible
ultrasound to deafen the microphone of the smart speaker
when the user needs privacy protection (Figure 4a). Using a
remote control, users are able to engage/disengage the inter-
vention without having to physically interact with it. When
disengaging the jamming, the user can immediately interact
with the smart speaker. Due to non-linearities in off-the-shelf
microphones’ power and diaphragm [28, 27, 36, 10], Ob-
fuscator creates high-power, human-inaudible noise at these
microphones but does not affect its operation otherwise.
Figure 4b shows the captured signals from a commodity mi-
crophone before and after Obfuscator is engaged. Before
jamming is invoked, the microphone records a conversation
which is audible at playback. After engaging Obfuscator, the
ultrasound jamming signal is recorded at the microphone, and
completely overwhelms the conversation’s signal.
Design Evolution: Obfuscator’s circuitry includes a DC power
supply that is a remote-controlled, an ultrasound generator
(produces signals at 27 kHz), and a horn speaker that emits
the ultrasound signal. We explored different design options
for the prototype that houses the circuitry. A challenge in pro-
totyping Obfuscator was the relatively large footprint of the
circuitry as compared to the other interventions. Additionally,
horn speakers are bulky, and reducing their size considerably
inhibits their effectiveness.
(a) V.1 (b) V.2 (c) V.3
Figure 5: The design evolution of the Obfuscator intervention.
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Our design process started with a search for a privacy
metaphor, one that creates the perception of privacy control
for the users. Our initial prototype was based on a “cage”
metaphor. Here, the Obfuscator intervention is housed in a
cage-like structure with a door, and the smart speaker is placed
within the cage. When the user closes the cage door, Obfus-
cator generates the ultrasound obfuscation signal to prevent
the smart speaker from listening. The user has to manually
open the door to disable obfuscation and communicate with
the smart speaker. Closing the door "locks” the device in a
cage, providing a user with a perception that the device is not
active and their space is private. Opening the door unlocks
and opens up the smart speaker to the user’s space.
The first version of the Obfuscator intervention followed the
cage metaphor as a 3D printed cylinder (Figure 5a). The
cylinder has two compartments; the lower chamber containing
the circuit and the ultrasound speaker. The upper chamber
has space for the smart speaker as well as the door. The first
version has a height of 15.5 cm and a diameter of 12 cm. We
refined the cage-based design into a smaller, lighter and less
conspicuous 3D-printed cylinder (Figure 5b) with a height of
13 cm and a diameter of 11 cm.
Based on pilot studies with 2 participants, we found both ver-
sions to be neither user-friendly nor fitting with home decor.
Participants explicitly indicated that this design was not some-
thing they would want in their homes. Further, we observed
that individuals did not associate with the privacy metaphor.
First, they did not favor the idea of physically interacting
with the prototype as it takes away the convenience of using
a hands-free device. Second, covering the smart speaker in-
side the cylinder deprives the users of the ability to observe
the visual cue. This is a short-coming of placing the smart
speaker within the intervention. Finally, they thought that the
actions of opening and closing the prototype door was con-
spicuous, and would label them as privacy-conscious in the
eyes of others.
We factored these opinions into designing a third version of the
prototype. We considered three aspects that the users were not
fond of: physical interactions with the door, covering the smart
speaker, and the aesthetics. The third version of the prototype
(Figure 5c) features a platform-like solution which addresses
those shortcomings. This version has a glass cylinder which
houses the circuit and is covered by decorative sand; its height
is 11 cm and diameter is 12.5 cm. The platform, where the
smart speaker sits, is encased with synthetic leather. The user
can engage/disengage the jamming signal via remote control,
obviating the need for physical interaction. This version of the
Obfuscator intervention follows a different privacy metaphor:
“virtual veil.” By engaging the jamming signal, Obfuscator
creates a virtual privacy dome around the smart speaker, pre-
venting it from listening to the conversations. Our subsequent
discussions and reflections about this version revealed that the
open nature of the prototype might not enforce the privacy
metaphor; users are less likely to perceive privacy control over
the smart speaker. This version remains co-located with the
smart speaker, increasing its form factor. This is not ideal in
scenarios where the smart speaker is concealed.
The design search process led to our final prototype of the
Obfuscator intervention, as shown in Figure 3c. We substan-
tially reduced the form factor of the final version. The new
prototype houses the same circuitry in a glass candle holder.
The glass is filled with decorative sands and sealed with bur-
gundy burlap. The user only needs to place the prototype next
to the smart speaker. This prototype is built using commonly
found household artifacts, enabling it to fit in with existing
decor. This final prototype represents a technology probe that
allows us to identify the design guidelines for privacy enhanc-
ing interventions in the smart speaker ecosystem. The probe
packages the core functionality of the privacy intervention: a
jamming device which enforces the privacy metaphor. We kept
the prototype as simple and basic as possible to avoid making
design decisions [4] that influence our findings. In our study,
we use the prototype to elicit participants’ reflections about
what design elements are missing and need to be introduced.
In-home User Study
We recruited 24 families (including single individuals) within
a 15-mile radius of a university campus, utilizing the univer-
sity mailing list, over two phases. Our first phase included 13
interviews, while the second phase (10 months later) included
11 interviews. We chose to perform shorter and focused in-
terviews as opposed to longer studies (such as diary studies);
the tech probe approach allowed us to capture our many goals
related to capturing baseline privacy perceptions, introduce
the privacy priming, and gain reflection upon interacting with
the interventions. The results reported in the paper are based
on interviews with 30 participants (P1−P30) from these 24
interviews2. Our data coding and analysis started immediately
and took place simultaneously with data collection, enabling
us to monitor the emergence of new codes and themes and
determine saturation. We reached saturation by the 18th inter-
view and collected data from 6 more households to assess how
perceptions evolve with time. Our approach exhibits several
limitations, the most important of which is the sampling of
a relatively ethnically homogeneous population; the reported
results are less likely to generalize to another population of
users. We sought to recruit participants with different back-
grounds in age, educational background, and technological
proficiency. Our participant pool comprised of 15 males and
15 females. The youngest participant was 12 years old, while
the oldest was 67 (with a mean age of 37.4 and standard devia-
tion of 13.9). The occupations of the participants ranged from
students to faculty. The wide spectrum in age and profession
enables us to gain feedback from a pool with varied technical
knowledge and awareness, and offers a breadth of experiences
and backgrounds that are useful to analyze user interactions
with the interventions.
We conducted all interviews in the participants’ homes at
a time of their convenience. Each interview lasted for 90
minutes on average, and the participants were compensated
for their time ($40 USD per study). The study protocol was
approved by our Institutional Review Board (IRB). We con-
ducted the interview in three stages, which we elaborate below.
2Some households had more than one participant.
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1. Environment Exploration: The interview began with the
participants providing a brief tour of their home. Empha-
sis was placed on the rooms with smart speakers. Then, the
interviewer and the participants convened in the room with
the frequently used smart speaker, so as to simulate a com-
mon usage scenario. After obtaining informed consent, the
interviewer provided each participant with an online question-
naire to fill. This pre-interview questionnaire contains a set
of four questions on a Likert scale to capture the participant’s
privacy baseline. We utilize the “Concern for Privacy” [24]
scale which is modeled after the well-known “Information
Privacy Concern scale” developed by Smith et al. [30], related
to online services. The objective of the pre-interview question-
naire was to establish baseline privacy perceptions. After the
questionnaire, the interviewer asked more detailed questions
about the smart speaker’s role in the participant’s life. The
questions focused on frequency, duration, and the purpose
of usage. Also, the questions covered the conversations and
activities participants have around their smart speakers. Then,
the interviewer inquired about the participant’s degree of trust
in these devices (in terms of the potential for their conver-
sations to be recorded), and trust in their manufacturers and
hypothetical third parties (with whom the recordings might
be shared/leaked). The interviewer asked whether individuals
have read the news or heard anecdotes about unexpected or
undesirable behaviors by the smart speakers. These questions
created the appropriate context to discuss privacy-preserving
interventions; while our questionnaire and follow-up questions
are capable of biasing the participants, we believe that they
are essential in creating the right environment to discuss the
ambiguous space of privacy issues surrounding smart speakers.
2. Interaction with Interventions: In a randomly generated
order, the experimenter briefly introduced the capabilities of
each intervention. The participants were given time to fa-
miliarize themselves with the intervention and set it up. By
setting up the intervention themselves, we expected the par-
ticipants to gain greater familiarity with its operation. The
random ordering of intervention across participants helped to
reduce ordering effects. In settings with families, the inter-
viewer asked different family members to interact with the
intervention individually. After setting up the intervention,
the interviewer asked the participant to issue voice commands
after engaging/disengaging the intervention. At each step, the
interviewer probed the participant about their level of com-
fort with the intervention and how it impacts the usability of
their smart speaker. The participants were encouraged to envi-
sion future use-cases for each intervention and stress-test the
intervention’s functionality.
After the interaction with each intervention, the interviewer
inquired about the participant’s level of trust in the intervention.
Based on the nature of the response, the interviewer asked
several follow up questions to determine reasons for high/low
levels of trust. The interviewer proceeded to discuss perceived
privacy control, trust level, convenience, and aesthetics of the
interventions. These interview questions were designed to
elicit critical reflections.
3. Concluding Discussions: After interacting with the three
interventions, the interviewer engaged the participants in an
open-ended discussion about the interventions and their impact
on their privacy. The interviewer then administered another
survey (to determine any changes in their privacy perceptions
over the baseline measurements). This post-questionnaire
asked the same privacy-related questions as the pre-interview
survey, but contained questions to collect demographics infor-
mation. Finally, the participants received compensation.
All interviews were audio-recorded, resulting in over 30 hours
of recordings; photographs were taken of (a) the interventions
in action and (b) the areas where the smart speaker is typically
used. We then transcribed, coded and analyzed the interviews
using a Grounded Theory approach [6, 11]. The coding was
performed with two coders working independently. Our coders
were in moderate agreement, with a Cohen’s Kappa (κ) of
0.57 [31]. We started the analysis with an open-coding stage
to identify more than 200 informal codes that define critical
phenomena in the interview transcripts. Using these informal
codes, we extracted recurrent themes within the transcripts
and converged on a set of 85 formal codes. We further refined
the formal codes into 15 axial codes. Finally, we organized
the codes into four major themes as summarized in Table 2.
FINDINGS
In this section, we present and discuss the four key themes
that emerged from our analysis. In summary, we found that:
1. Participants were reluctant in sacrificing the convenience
associated with smart speakers; hands-free interaction was
most preferred, and physical interaction was seen as being
not ideal.
2. Participants expected bolt-on interventions with existing
household decor and to offer cues informing them of the
state of both the intervention and the smart speaker.
3. Multifunctionality, fine-grained control (per-user and per-
device), and cost of the intervention are important factors
that might influence adoption.
4. While participants believed in both actual and perceived
privacy violations, they were comfortable with their conver-
sations being overheard because they believed that their con-
versations were not sensitive (in comparison to personally
identifiable information available using their location/web
footprint).
User Attitudes regarding the Smart Speakers
Types of Users: Through our study, we identified two types of
users: (a) casual users who utilize their smart speakers for set-
ting alarms, inquiring about the weather, asking questions etc.,
and (b) power users who have integrated the smart speakers
with other devices in their homes (such as smart lights, house
monitoring systems etc.). We also observed that while most
participants in our first interview phase were casual users, a
majority of the users in the second interview phase belonged
to the latter category. This phenomena could be based on the
pervasive availability and easy installation of various smart
home devices. We observed that power users were also more
familiar with various perceived privacy violations and with the
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Attitudes towards Smart Speaker
Characterizes the user’s (a) nature and awareness, (b) technological
know-how, (c) trust in smart speaker manufacturer, and (d) perceptions
towards listening and recording.
Attitudes towards Intervention
Characterizes the user’s (a) interaction preference, (b) comfort-levels
with regards to usage, (c) long-term technological preferences, and (d)
trust attitude towards intervention.
Aesthetics and Physical Footprint
Characterizes the user’s (a) aesthetics preference, (b) physical footprint
preference, (c) perception of the informativeness of cues, and (d) prefer-
ence between bolt-on and built-in interventions.
Utility of Interventions
Characterizes the user’s preference with respect to intervention’s (a)
multifunctionality, (b) cost, (c) ability to provide fine-grained control,
and (d) mode of operation i.e. proactive vs. reactive,
Table 2: Summary of the extracted themes.
potential for actual violations (though not with the specifics
of how this may occur). Consistent with our expectations, we
also observed that users in the second interview phase were
aware of recent privacy violations. We expect that power users
will be more willing to adapt privacy-preserving interventions
as they have more to lose if their devices were compromised,
i.e., as their households were more tightly integrated with the
smart speaker, compromising the smart speaker could be the
gateway to more exploits. We also observed that a majority
of the participants did not change their conversations around
the smart speakers (in comparison to conversations in rooms
without smart speakers), but a small minority reported feeling
conscious of having discussion around them.
Understanding of smart speaker operation: We observed that
a minority of the participants were unaware of how smart
speaker’s operate, i.e., they were unaware that their vocal com-
mands were processed off-site, and were used to improve the
machine learning algorithms used. Participant P5, for example,
believed that the smart speakers did "some local learning but
also some more... I think at some point people were involved in
[the processing]... I think there’s an automated learning that
occurs to adjust itself to the household right?" These percep-
tions were shared across participants with different educational
backgrounds.
Trust in device manufacturers: Trust in the device manufactur-
ers fragmented our participant population. This includes frac-
tions (a) that believed that these organizations can be trusted;
their belief comes from faith in the legal system which would
penalize organizations if there is evidence indicating malprac-
tice, (b) that believed that some manufacturers were not in
the business of collecting personal information and can be
trusted, (c) that trusted the manufacturers, but believed that
any information collected could be leaked, or shared with
other organizations they do not trust, and (d) that trusted the
manufacturers as long as there is personal utility from their
information being collected. A recurrent theme was partici-
pants’ comfort in being recorded because they believed they
were part of a large pool of smart speaker users, and their
vocal footprint provided corporations no additional insight
into their lives. Participant P10 explains, "I mean we’re not
planning any nefarious capers... like we’re very boring people
and therefore nothing that we’re talking about would be of
interest to anyone on the other end of [the smart speaker ]."
Some participants justified this notion by commenting on the
nature of advertisements they received after introducing the
smart speaker in their homes; P8 states "the way Google that
Google ads operates ... you know if... I talk about something;
it starts showing up ... if I’m scrolling through Facebook".
Vocal footprint vs. other sources of information: Some par-
ticipants suggested that the vocal footprint shared with smart
speakers is both limited and not as informative as their web
footprint and location information. Participant P2 states, "my
information is certainly more out there on social media than it
is [with smart speakers ]. I also I don’t feel like I have anything
to hide... I mean if they use my information it’s going to be for
some monetary reason like to sell to me". These participants
also believed that social engineering is a more potent form of
harm than audio-based profiling. Participants’ perceptions did
not conform to academic attack models. While we observed
that participants were comfortable if their conversations were
overheard, they were uncomfortable if the entity overhearing
is a human i.e. participants were more comfortable with algo-
rithms digesting their information. However, all participants
agreed that recording and storing data was unacceptable.
User Attitudes regarding the Interventions
State of operation: Participants believed that the current de-
signs of the interventions make it too inconvenient to use
the smart speaker. They state that using privacy preserving
interventions makes the interaction with a smart speaker a
two-phase procedure: first check the state of the intervention
(engaged vs. not) and disengage if necessary, and then interact
with the smart speaker. They claim that the additional set
of steps defeats the purpose of owning a smart speaker i.e.
to have spontaneous interactions. Some participants stated
that the interventions added a mental burden in terms of re-
membering the state of the intervention. Participant P9 said:
"when you were to power it off say how do you distinguish
that state [when it has no power when using Blackout ] from
a wake word doing nothing, like I don’t know I unmute this
right now ... it looks the same." Participants believed that
owning these interventions will serve as a contingency if there
is documented evidence of foul play; P9 states "we lock our
doors at night; it’s [the] proactive step... nothing bad might
happen... it’s insurance pretty much."
Ergonomics: Participants were comfortable with the usability
of the interventions. The interventions were easy to set up
and use, and the time taken for the intervention to get engaged
is acceptable (almost instantaneous in all cases). However,
participants expressed dissatisfaction at the longer boot-up
times induced by Blackout. For example, P8 stated,"I would
find it especially irritating". Participants suggested that tech-
nologies such as Obfuscator that, when disengaged, make
the smart speaker immediately available were ideal; P13 ex-
plains, "I’d probably lean more towards something like [the
Obfuscator ] over even like just the outlet for the convenience
factor of like you can turn that off with a button and not really
have to worry about [the Dot] like warming up." Some partici-
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pants were concerned about the generalizability of Obfuscator.
They believed that the technology is specific to their smart
speakers, and would not extend to future smart speakers or
smart speakers made by other vendors. Participants were also
comfortable with the interventions because they were not con-
nected to the network (and thus believed that the Obfuscator
intervention will not be a privacy violation). Their comfort
levels with the interventions were tied to their belief that man-
ufacturer heterogeneity introduces greater privacy protection,
i.e., neither Blackout nor Obfuscator were manufactured by
the smart speaker manufacturers. In fact, participant P10, when
asked if they had a preference over the intervention developer,
replied: "I wouldn’t but I’m sure like older generations would
feel much more comfortable ... if it came from McAfee."
We observed that participants unanimously found the mute-
button the least convenient intervention; the act of walking to
the smart speaker to engage/ imposed a significant usability
barrier. Participants were more comfortable using a remote
control, but felt that their homes have many remotes, and that
the remotes could be easily misplaced. In fact, when propos-
ing the addition of another remote, P5 exclaimed, "they’re
all over the place, so many remotes! We can’t have another
remote." Some participants suggested moving intervention
control to a mobile phone app; unlike remote controls, par-
ticipants believed that their mobile phones were less prone
to being misplaced and alleviate other issues pertaining to
remotes. While participants enjoyed the convenience of using
the remote control, they were apprehensive in imagining a
voice-controlled intervention (as they were informed of how
smart speakers currently process voice commands off-site).
Trust in bolt-on interventions: Finally, participants trust bolt-
on interventions more than the built-in mute button. Partic-
ipants suggested that trust in the bolt-on intervention would
be low if it came from the device manufacturer, or any orga-
nization that had a similar business model. Participant P13
recommended "a competing company or just a general com-
pany that seems like they’re like honest" could develop the
interventions. Participants suggested that bolt-on interventions
were easier to debug, and were easier to understand. However,
participants feel that purchasing one bolt-on intervention for
every smart speaker is not economically feasible.
Aesthetics and Physical Footprint
With regards to the mute button, participants felt comfortable
with its design and placement, while finding it inconvenient to
use. A very small fraction of the participants were unaware of
the existence of the mute button, and an even smaller fraction
were unaware of its utility.
Physical Footprint: Participants were concerned with the phys-
ical footprint of our designed interventions. While smart speak-
ers were electronic devices, participants often associate them
with decorative items (Figure 6) and invest effort in determin-
ing where these devices should be placed. A common example
of a description about the Obfuscator solution we received
was P2’s description: "a piling on of devices". Some partici-
pants found it difficult to reorganize other items around the
smart speaker to facilitate the intervention. Additionally, some
participants prefer to conceal their outlets, and Blackout-like
Figure 6: The placement of an Amazon Echo Dot inside an
owl-shaped holder in one of the households.
interventions were inconvenient in such scenarios. Participants
were uncomfortable with interventions that involve additional
wires (as in the case of Obfuscator).
Cues: Another point of contention is the utility of visual cues
in the interventions. Recall that Blackout has an LED indica-
tor that glows red when engaged; participants found the the
color of the indicator a red herring — the red color led par-
ticipants to believe that the device was malfunctioning. This
situation is further exacerbated in the scenario where partici-
pants preferred to have their outlets hidden. Participants did
not notice that the interventions had visual cues, and believed
that this complicated understanding its state. While partici-
pants found the visual cues uninformative in some settings,
they did state that having cues relieves burdens associated
with ascertaining device/intervention state. They suggested
that other cues, which should be more informative, would
be preferred in such situations. For example, P9 states that
they would like to "see the video [of the Obfuscator signal]
feedback to the [listening] device, but have [the Obfuscator
haptic light] go green when it’s working."
Preference towards built-in solutions: Some participants sug-
gested that they would prefer a trustworthy built-in interven-
tion; this could be designed as software updates (or skills)
that could be added to the smart speaker. They argue that
built-in interventions were preferred as they do not add to the
physical footprint of the smart speaker, and it does not add
additional economic strain. Building upon what was discussed
earlier, participants suggested that their ideal built-in interven-
tion should also be voice activated. We argue that the previous
statements (with regards to the trustworthy built-in interven-
tions) were oxymorons i.e. an intervention that is built-in can
not be trustworthy as it is produced by the organization that
is allegedly violating privacy. How one can design such an
intervention, potentially using techniques from cryptography
and secure hardware design, is out of the scope of this paper.
Utility of the Interventions
Damage to environment: Participants were concerned that Ob-
fuscator will cause harm to animals present in their homes;
questions we received upon presenting the Obfuscator were
often like P2’s, "is [this] going to ... make my dog crazy?" .
While we did not observe any agitation/discomfort, the partic-
ipants suggested that their pets could perceive the ultrasound
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signals, and were not bothered by it. Additionally, participants
were concerned about exposing their smart speakers to ultra-
sound for a prolonged period of time. Again, a detailed study
is needed to understand the impact of ultrasound on electronic
devices.
Cost and Multi-Functionality: Cost was repeatedly discussed;
participants suggested that the cost of the interventions should
not exceed the cost of the smart speaker. Some participants
received their smart speakers as gifts, and were unaware of
their market value. Consequently, they were unable to estab-
lish a value for the intervention; P6 states, "that’s a really
interesting question in the sense that I didn’t pay for this in
the first place. Maybe that’s also another reason that I don’t
have much investment in using this in general". On the other
end of the investment spectrum, we observed that participants
who owned multiple smart devices were invested in safeguard-
ing their privacy, and were willing to adopt the interventions
independent of the cost. Participant P6, who had previously
stopped using their smart speakers due to privacy concern,
even stated that they would consider using their device once
more given that the intervention were, "cheap... I think would
have to rival that remote plug-in cost right because ... it has
to be like a cheap utility ... or a cheap accessory like that."
Participants were also concerned about the amount of elec-
tricity consumed by Obfuscator; Obfuscator could be used
in a proactive way i.e. always-on, or in a reactive way i.e.
use when needed. Participants felt that a reactive approach,
though tedious, would be easier to understand. Participants
also believed that a (potentially high) cost could be justified
if the intervention provided multiple features. This could be
achieved by integrating the design of Obfuscator with other
home decor, such as lamps, lights, clocks, radios etc.
Fine-Grained Control: The final observation we make is an
extension to multi-functionality; we observed that in some
households, some participants preferred to utilize the inter-
vention more than others. In such scenarios, they desired
customized usage profiles based on their requirements i.e. fine-
grained control per-user. Another observation we make is that
some participants preferred to have one intervention (like Ob-
fuscator) being used to preserve privacy against a wide range
of smart speaker-like devices. In such scenarios, fine-grained
control per-device was desired. Based on the current design
of the Obfuscator prototype, meeting both these requirements
is challenging, and requires further research.
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
In our observations and analysis, several themes emerged
which offer the following implications (Table 3) for the design
of privacy-preserving interventions for smart speakers.
1. Aesthetics: We observed the aesthetics of the privacy inter-
ventions to be an important issue for our participants. While
they appreciated the value provided by both Blackout and
Obfuscator, participants felt uncomfortable with their current
designs. Even though Obfuscator’s current design (as opposed
to earlier versions) seemed more homespun, participants pre-
ferred the interventions to match their individual decorating
styles (one example is shown in Figure 6). Many participants
suggested that the intervention should come in different forms,
1. Aesthetics
The interventions should be offered in different forms, shapes, and colors
to fit within people decors and furniture.
2. Physical Footprint
The footprint of the intervention should be small enough to not force a
reorganization of the layout of owner’s house.
3. Multi-Functionality
The intervention is better when providing additional functionality (such
as a clock) to reduce its footprint and integrate better with home decor.
4. Ease of Deployment and Understanding
Battery-powered interventions are easier to deploy. Also, proper under-
standing of the privacy metaphor improves the adoption of interventions.
5. Trust in Technology
Trustworthy interventions are: bolt-on, not network connected, designed
by a different trustworthy organization, and pose no additional risk.
6. Mode of Interaction
Using the intervention should not change the interaction with the smart
speaker. Hands-free interaction is most preferable.
7. Informative Cues
Interventions should offer cues that communicate their state. Visual,
auditory, or text cues might be applicable depending on the deployment.
8. Cost
The intervention should cost less than the smart speaker.
9. Fine-grained Privacy Control
The intervention can offer per-user and per-smart speaker privacy controls.
10. Awareness
Awareness of privacy violations increases trust in intervention designers.
Table 3: Summary of the identified design guidelines.
shapes, and colors, enabling easier integration within their
home decor. As individual tastes vary widely, devising a one-
fits-all design is challenging. One possible approach is to
explore different design options for different types of users,
including shapes, forms, colors, and material. This approach
has been successful with smart speakers, where participants
feel comfortable with the aesthetic of the smart speaker. For
example, Amazon has four offerings of their Echo product
featuring combinations of forms and fabric colors. With time,
participants perceived the smart speaker’s design to become
more polished, from an inexpensive plastic exterior, to more
refined design (with fabric and different colors). Participants
expressed similar concerns about Blackout, but stressed more
upon its physical footprint, which we discuss next.
2. Physical Footprint: Since the smart speakers we consid-
ered were small and compact, participants preferred a similar
physical footprint for the interventions. Several participants
expressed concerns regarding the size of both Blackout and
Obfuscator, suggesting that similar functionality could be
achieved with a smaller prototype. They believed that using
Obfuscator (which also needs to be placed close to the smart
speaker) requires them to significantly reorganize their exist-
ing layout. We discuss how this requirement can be mitigated
in the next paragraph about Multi-Functionality. While the
form factor of Blackout can be reduced trivially, doing so for
Obfuscator requires additional research; the size and shape
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of the horn speaker in our current prototype was chosen to
ensure maximum ultrasound distribution and coverage. Ex-
tending such a design to smart speakers that are larger, or have
a different orientation for the microphone inputs will require
rethinking the design and form factor.
3. Multi-Functionality: Closely tied to the aesthetics, partici-
pants indicated preference toward an intervention (specifically
Obfuscator) that offered features beyond privacy-preservation.
They suggested that the Obfuscator intervention could be com-
bined with other household artifacts, such as a lamp, radio,
clock etc. Doing so reduces the footprint of the intervention.
Multi-functionality provides an alternative avenue for cus-
tomizing the product, making it easier to integrate with exist-
ing household decoration. Participants who are worried about
the social stigma of being labeled as overly privacy-conscious
would benefit from such designs, i.e., the intervention would
be inconspicuous. Another interpretation of this point could
be to envision interventions as artifacts that co-exist with the
smart speaker, such as a stand to hold the smart speaker,3, or
a sleeve for the smart speaker.4 There is a demand for such
artifacts based on our analysis of reviews for such products,
and we believe such designs would promote adoption.
4. Ease of Deployment and Understanding: Participants pre-
ferred to have a solution that was easy to deploy in their homes;
the biggest impediment to any intervention similar to Black-
out is its physical footprint. Many participants preferred to
conceal the interventions’ wiring, and the nearby outlets can
be hard to reach. Attaching Blackout to wall outlets, even
once, requires considerable re-positioning of other devices
and their wires. Attaching Obfuscator would require an addi-
tional outlet, which is not always readily available. One naïve
solution would be to split the outlet among multiple devices.
Participants suggested that an Obfuscator design capable of
operating on batteries would be more preferred, even if this
required periodic replacement. Participants also suggested that
since the current version of an Obfuscator-style intervention
will not operate in an always-on mode, the energy consump-
tion will be limited. All participants were able to easily grasp
the metaphor associated with Blackout, but the technology
behind Obfuscator proved complicated for some. Thus, inter-
ventions whose operation is easy to explain may be preferred.
While Obfuscator is easy to use once deployed, debugging it
may pose problems for users who are lack proper understand-
ing of its operation. We also believe that understanding the
detriments (if any) of ultrasound towards humans, animals,
and other electronics may put users at ease.
5. Trust in the Technology: Participants were more comfort-
able with technologies that they believe will survive the “test
of time,” i.e., be useful for smart speaker models in the future.
The privacy guarantees of Blackout can be thwarted by smart
speakers that are battery operated. However, thwarting Obfus-
cator’s guarantees is more challenging and would potentially
require much more expensive microphones. As discussed ear-
lier, trust also stems from knowing that the interventions do
not pose any additional risk. Specifically, we observed that (a)
3http://tiny.cc/v7jpcz
4http://tiny.cc/16jpcz
participants wanted to know about any detriments introduced
by the interventions such as potential damage to the smart
speaker by frequently disconnecting it from its power source
or subjecting it to ultrasound; and (b) our current interventions
are not network connected and do not present the same risks as
the smart speakers. Finally, participants preferred our bolt-on
interventions as opposed to the built-in interventions as they
were designed by an organization they trusted (more than the
smart speaker manufacturers).
6. Mode of Interaction: We observed that participants placed
a high value on the convenience of using smart speakers from
which they are not willing to compromise. Thus, interventions
that, when disengaged, delay the smart speaker operation (as
in the case of Blackout) are not preferred (even though Black-
out provably preserves privacy, and its mode of operation is
very easy to understand). Additionally, any form of physical
interaction, be it using remotes or buttons, is far from ideal;
some participants expressed preference toward using an app on
their smartphones. We believe that future privacy-preserving
solutions must be designed so as to disrupt the convenience
of the use of these systems minimally. An ideal design would
have a voice interface that allows the user to control it as they
control their smart speakers. However, such an always-on
and listening privacy-preserving solution can have the same
pitfalls as smart speakers, and they must be designed in a
manner that does not erode user trust. For example, the can
lack a network interface to provide the users with hard privacy
assurances. Another issue that may arise with voice-activated
interventions is erroneous activations; understanding how this
can be minimized requires additional research.
7. Informative Cues: As stated earlier, some participants con-
cealed their smart speakers and would prefer concealing their
interventions as well. Some participants take this notion to
the extreme; they believe that any electronic device that does
not provide extensive visual information should be concealed.
Thus, visual cues are not ideal in all situations. Additionally,
participants suggested that the red light on the Blackout inter-
vention suggested that the intervention was broken, as opposed
to indicating the state of the intervention. Interacting with the
smart speaker when the intervention is enabled helps users
determine the state of the smart speaker (operational vs. not),
but such an approach is reactive. Participants indicated prefer-
ence for a proactive approach. Combined with the observation
that visual cues are not informative, we believe that auditory
cues may be preferable. The Obfuscator-style intervention
can announce using speech or text that the smart speaker is
inactive when users try to activate it.
8. Cost: Another factor that impacts adoption is cost of the
smart speaker. A large fraction of our participants own smart
plugs similar to Blackout, leading us to believe that such an
intervention is affordable. However, the cost of prototyping
Obfuscator was $70, exceeding the cost of smart speakers
(priced at approx. $30). This cost includes the price of the
commodity parts needed to construct the prototype. Partici-
pants believe that the cost of the intervention should not ex-
ceed the cost of the smart speaker; this is especially true if the
intervention can provide privacy-protection against a single
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smart speaker. We believe that if such an intervention would
be adopted widely, the production costs could be amortized.
Additionally, understanding the engineering requirements to
design an Obfuscator-like intervention that provides privacy
against various smart speakers located at different parts of a
home requires independent research.
9. Fine-grained Privacy Control: Several households owned
more than a single smart speaker, and they had members with
different (and potentially conflicting) privacy requirements.
Thus, we believe that there is a requirement for (a) fine-grained
control per user and (b) fine-grained control per smart speaker.
For the latter, a naïve solution would be to deploy one interven-
tion for every smart speaker in the household, but depending
on the cost per intervention, such a solution may not scale.
Thus, an ideal design would provide privacy protection for
more than one smart speaker. This design could be concep-
tualized as smaller interventions co-located with the smart
speakers but controlled centrally. Providing per-user control
is a more challenging problem; it requires understanding how
disparate the privacy requirements are, how frequently users
are utilizing a smart speaker together, and how to mitigate con-
flicts should they arise. Providing a solution to this problem
requires additional research [35].
10. Effect of Awareness: Based on our pre- and post-interview
questionnaires, we observed the following trend amidst the
participants of our interview phases. The participants of our
second phase are more concerned about the potential privacy
threats from the smart speakers (in comparison to the par-
ticipants of the first phase, who are also concerned). This
concern stems from increased awareness; recent smart speaker
mishaps, erroneous code used in them, and immoral practices
by device manufacturers have led to an increasing concern
amidst the participants. Based on our discussion, we observed
that participants believe that these issues are not being seri-
ously audited by the device manufacturers. Discussing various
loopholes that can be implemented in the built-in interventions
in the status quo (i.e. local wake word processing, and the mute
button) also increased participants’ awareness. Due to these
factors, participants believe that interventions created by third
parties (who do not share the same business motives as the
device manufacturer) provide the desired privacy properties.
RELATED WORK
Privacy Perceptions: The methodology of our study is most
similar to Zheng et al. [38], and Kaaz et al. [18]; however,
their objective is different. They attempt to understand the
privacy perceptions of users living in homes with various IoT
devices. Similar to our work, surveys are carried out in [7,
23, 3], where the authors try to identify the various challenges
associated with setting up and using these devices. Zeng
et al. [34] and Lau et al. [21] attempt to understand smart
speaker users’ reasons for adoption through a combination
of a detailed diary study and in-home interviews. Similar to
this work, we observe that smart speaker users are not privacy
conscious because of the lack of value they associate with their
conversational data. Along a similar vein, Abdi et al. [1] find
that users have incomplete mental models of smart speakers.
Similar to our work, they use this understanding to present
design recommendations. Some of our findings are coherent
with those of Malkin et al. [22], e.g., participants are unaware
that their conversations are being recorded and stored.
We stress that the primary contribution of our work is not in
ascertaining the privacy perceptions people have about smart
speakers (as done in earlier studies). We wish to understand
users’ perceptions towards privacy-enhancing technologies
and to use this insight to guide future design of both smart
speakers and such technologies.
Intervention Design: Prior research has investigated system-
level solutions to these privacy threats. Feng et al. [9] propose
continuous authentication as a mechanism to thwart privacy
issues related to smart speakers. Gao et al. [10] propose using
ultrasound jamming to address stealthy recording. In this work,
we wish to validate the usability claims made by the above;
consequently, we base our intervention design on the above
proposals. Other solutions involve intercepting/monitoring
traffic at the network gateway [2, 29]. However, such solu-
tions fail when network traffic is encrypted. A maliciously
compromised device can cache recorded conversations and
leak them, using a valid skill, in a stealthy manner.A network-
level solution would be ineffective in preventing these types
of privacy leaks, especially when the attacker introduces code
to react maliciously to voice inputs [20].
The Alias project [19] is designed to achieve similar goals
to ours. This solution constantly plays noise through a small
speaker placed atop the smart speaker and stops the noise
upon hearing a custom wake word. Their solution differs from
Obfuscator in two ways. First, the Alias intervention does
not use ultrasound; the reduced form factor is achieved by
not using horn speakers, which are crucial for transmitting
ultrasound. The noise generated by the Alias prototype may
be bothersome to pets and potentially to people. Second, the
Alias intervention obscures the visual cue provided by the
smart speaker; such a design is not preferred.
Design Studies: To safeguard privacy and security in the smart
home, Zeng et al. [35] prototyped a smart home app and
evaluated its effectiveness through a month-long and in-home
user study with seven households; the users are assumed to be
non-adversarial and cooperative. They used their findings to
guide future designs for smart home applications. To achieve
similar goals as ours, but for smart homes (as opposed to
smart speakers), Yao et al. [33] adapted a co-design approach
and designed solutions with non-expert users. We borrow
our study methodology from the work of Odom et al. [25];
technology probe studies serve multiple purposes related to
designing, prototyping, and field testing the interventions.
CONCLUSIONS
We presented the design and prototyping of two privacy-
preserving interventions: ‘Obfuscator’ targeted at disabling
recording at the microphones, and ‘Blackout’ targeted at dis-
abling power to the smart speaker. We presented our findings
from a technology probe study involving 24 households that
interacted with our prototypes, aimed to gain a better under-
standing this design space. Our study revealed several design
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dimensions for the design of privacy interventions for smart
speakers.
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